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Abstract

A model of household optimizing behavior in a household farm
and a cooperative farm is presented in this paper. In the
household farming system, the returns to scale are sacrificed,
while, in the cooperative farming system, effort metering is
required for the purpose of income distribution. Their relative
efficiencies are compared with adoption of specific functional
forms. It is found that, when monitoring is minimal in the
cooperative farm due to the difficulty of monitoring in
agricultural production, a household will supply more effort in
the household farm than in the cooperative farm; and, as a
consequence, the total output produced by the household farming
system is larger than that produced by the cooperative farming
system. In addition, a change from the cooperative system to the
household system is very likely to be a Pareto-improvement.
Empirical data collected from recent rural de-collectivization in
China are applied to examine some implications of the above
model. The results are consistent with the predictions of the
theory. It is found that, due to the increase in effort supply by
each household, a shift from the cooperative farming system to
the household farming system resulted in a 19.7% productivity
jump, and over 60% of the 26.4% output growth between 1980 and
1983 can be attributed to this institutional change.

This paper is motivated by an attempt to develop a consistent model
that incorporates both the household farm and the cooperative farm under
the same optimizing framework and to compare these two farming
institutions' relative efficiencies. It also attempts to use the data
collected from recent rural de-collectivization in China to examine some
of the implications of the model and as a by-product to assess the
impacts of recent rural institutional change on China's agricultural
production.
An important issue that confronts most developing countries is how
to develop their agriculture rapidly in order to support urban
industrialization and to meet the ever-increasing food demand from
explosive population growth. Small and fragmented holdings, which
characterize the landscapes in most developing countries, are often
regarded as a great obstacle for mechanization, irrigation, plant
protection, efficient allocation of inputs, and so forth. Cooperative
farming, consequently, is considered by many policymakers, in both
socialist and nonsocialist countries, as an attractive way of land
consolidation and productivity improvement. However, agricultural
cooperatives in the developing countries often end up with failures,
despite substantial government support. 1 Furthermore, the household farm
seems to be the dominant form of farming institution in the developed
countries. Nevertheless, the prevalence of household farms in the
developed countries is not due to the lack of economies of scale in
agriculture. Empirical evidences show that the returns to scale are not
negligible. 2

Whereas opponents of the cooperative farm often argue that

pooling of private land deprives peasants of a sense of independence and
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thus contains disincentive for production (Tai, p. 235), the formal
models of cooperative farming developed by Sen, Israelsen, Futterman, and
so forth, suggest that the incentives to work in a cooperative farm shall
be higher than in a household farm. This paper hopes to contribute to the
understanding of the prevalence of the household farm and the incentive
issue in the cooperative farm.
The laborer is the most dynamic agent in production. He not only
provides the "brute force," like machinery or draft animals, but also
utilizes the other factors of production. It has been noticed that, given
technology, the outputs which can be produced by certain amounts of
physical inputs depend on how these inputs are utilized by laborers. It
has also been noticed that different institutions may influence a
laborer's willingness to contribute effort. Following Leibenstein's
celebrated paper, the relative efficiency of different institutions is
often referred to as "x-efficiency." There have only been a few
econometric studies that tried to estimate the relative efficiencies of
the cooperative farm versus the household farm in the economic
literature; furthermore, their evidence is derived from an ad hoc
inclusion of institutional dummies in the production function. 3 As
Griliches (pp. 331-2) has commented, "it does not further our
understanding of growth to label the unexplained residual changes in
output as technical change. Nor does it help much to measure these
changes accurately if we do not know what they are." The same comments
should also be applicable to "x-efficiency," if we do not know what it
is. To gain some insights about why peasants behaves differently in a
cooperative farm than in a household farm and how productivity can be
2

affected by a change from a cooperative farming system to a household
farming system, a behavior model that consists of both these two
institutions is needed.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section I formulates a
simple model of the household in which the optimum levels of effort
contributions under the household farming system and the cooperative
farming system are explored explicitly. Their relative efficiencies are
compared under more specific functional forms. Predictions regarding how
changes in the farming system will affect the level of effort supply are
then derived. It is found that when monitoring of effort in agricultural
production is difficult, a household will contribute less effort in a
cooperative farm than in a household farm. Although the economies of
scale are sacrificed in a household farm, the effort effect outweighs the
scale effect. A change from the cooperative farming system will result in
an increase in total output. In addition, this institutional change is a
Pareto-improvement under very wide ranges of possible production
technology. Section II describes the data sources. Two levels of data are
used. The first data set consists of the township-level input-output data
of grain production in three counties from a prefecture in Anhui
Province. The data covers from 1979 to 1983. One of the counties had the
majority of its cooperative teams changed to a household-based system in
1980, while the majority of cooperative teams in the other two counties
changed in 1981. The other data set consists of the province-level
agricultural input-output data from 1981 to 1983. As the rates of
decollectivization in each province are available in this data set, the
impacts on agricultural production of changing from a cooperative system
3

to a household system can be directly assessed. Based on the theoretical
model in Section I, Section III specifies the empirical framework to be
applied to the above data sets. Results from both levels' analyses are
reported in Section IV. The evidence indicates that the household system
is a more efficient institution compared with the cooperative system,
which is consistent with the implications of the model. Finally, some
concluding remarks are presented in Section V.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to examine the relative efficiencies of the cooperative
farming system compared with the household farming system and derive
testable hypotheses about households' behaviors in responding to changes
in institutions, a one-period household model is constructed. It is
assumed that N identical households exist.

Each household is bestowed

with the same given amounts of labor force, L, and land, K. Effort
consists of quantity of work and quality of work. Production of a single
commodity with an exogenously determined price is hypothesized to be a
function of effective labor expended and land employed. For a given unit
of labor force, the effective labor depends on the quantity of work and
the quality of work that are provided by this unit of labor. The quantity
of work is the conventionally measured labor hours. The quality of work
is the way that a laborer utilizes the conventional inputs in the process
of production.

The quantity of work and the quality of work that are

provided by a laborer will be called "effort." Effort is assumed to be a
variable ranging from zero to one. One means that the maximum
technologically possible amount of quantity of work and quality of work
4

are provided, while zero means no effort is contributed. These N
households can either work separately as N independent household farms or
they can pool their resources together as a cooperative farm in order to
exploit the economies of scale. Identical production functions are
assumed for both types of farms.
(1)

h, c,

t

where t denotes a household farm (h) or the cooperative farm (c), and Et
is the effective labor. In the cooperative farm, Ec = e L +
1
and Kc= nK. In a household farm, Eh= e·L
1.

'

and Kh = K

'

for i

1, . . . '

n. (In this paper, superscription denotes types of farm and subscription
denotes each household. Superscriptions and subscriptions will be
suppressed when there is no confusion).
Land and labor force are assumed given; each household,
nevertheless, can choose its level of effort contribution to maximize its
utility whether it works independently or belongs to the cooperative.
More concretely, it is assumed that
(2)

Max Ui
ei

for i

1,

... , N

where Ii is the ith household's income received from its own household
farm or from the cooperative. If a household works independently, its
income is just the value of its output, that is,
(3)

where Pis the relative price of the agricultural product to the
industrial product, or the terms of trade between rural goods and urban
5

goods.
The distribution of income in the cooperative is based on the
principle "to each according to his work." Each household will be awarded
work points for its contribution of effective labor. Net income of the
cooperative will be divided according to each household's share of work
point in the total work points of the cooperative. As the endowed labor
force is the same for each household, a household's work points will only
depend on its level of effort contribution and the degree of accuracy
with which effort is measured in the cooperative. The more accurate
effort metering is, the higher are the costs. The income of a household
in the cooperative is thus

(4)
where si is the ith household's work point share, C is the cost of effort
metering, and

IT

is the degree of accuracy of metering. C(.) is assumed to

be a convex function. Implicitly in this model is that effort metering is
required in the cooperative farm for the purpose of determining each
household's income share; however, no metering is necessary in the
household farm due to the fact that income need not to be subdivided.
In the remaining part of this section, we will first consider each
household's optimum effort contribution in the household farm and in the
cooperative farm, and then the relative efficiencies of these two farming
institutions will be compared, with adoption of more specific functional
forms.
Household Farms
The first-order condition for the ith household's utility

6

maximization subject to (1) and (3) is the following:

(5)

The left-hand side can be interpreted as the marginal rate of
substitution between income and leisure. The right-hand side is the
marginal income of effort. An optimum level of effort contribution is
reached at the point where the marginal rate of substitution between
income and leisure equals the marginal income of effort. Condition (5)
may be solved to provide a supply of effort to household farm function:
(6)

Since each household is assumed to be identical, in equilibrium they will
all have the same work intensity and produce the same amount of output.
The Cooperative Farm4
Determination of the effort supply in the cooperative farm is a more
complicated matter. As income in the cooperative farm is distributed
according to each household's work point share, we need to know how work
point and work point share are determined before we can investigate each
household's optimum effort contribution. The ith household's work point
share, si, is a ratio between the work points accumulated by the ith
household, hi, and the total work points in the cooperative, H:
(7)

The work point represents the ith household's contribution of effective

7

labor that is perceived and credited by the management of the
cooperative. Since the endowed labor force, L, is identical in each
household, the work point is, therefore, only a function of ei, the
effort contribution by a household, and n, the degree of accuracy with
which the effort is measured.
(8)

When the measurement is perfect,

1r

= 1.

In this case, hi= h(l, ei)

eiL. The work points received by each household just equals its
contribution of effective labor. When monitoring does not exist,
Under this condition, hi= h(0, ei)

1r

= 0.

1 for all i; that is, every

household is assumed to have worked equally at the maximum intensity, no
matter how hard it actually works. 6 The work point function also has the
following properties:

Bhi
---

~

0,

equality holds when

::,;

0,

equality holds when ei

1r

aei

(9)

8hi
---

an

a 2h-l

0·
'
l·
'

> 0

anaei
As each household is assumed to be identical, it is important to
mention here that, given the accuracy of effort metering, in equilibrium
each household will offer the same amount of effective labor and, as a
consequence, hi= hand si = 1/N, for every household.
Taking the accuracy of effort metering and the other households'
supplies of effective labor as given, a household i
8

will solve (2)

subject to (1), (4), (7), (8), and (9). the first-order condition is the
following:

8UiJ8ei

(10)

(1 - si)

. Ai .

aui/aii
where Ai
The left-hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between income
and leisure, which is the same expression as that in (5). Nevertheless,
the value of marginal income of effort for a household in the cooperative
farm is different from that in a household farm.

The first term on the

right-hand side is the gain from the increase in the production of the
cooperative farm, holding the work point share constant, and the second
term is the gain from the increase in the work point share. Notice that
Ai has the following properties: when n = 0, Ai= O; when n = 1, Ai= l;
and 8Ai/8n > 0. If the measurement of effort is perfect, a household gets
two compensations for an additional contribution of effective labor.
First, it will get a share of the increase in the output. Second, it will
get a larger share of the total net income, as now it contributes a
larger share of total effective labor, and thus has a larger share of
work points. On the other hand, if there is no monitoring, a peasant will
not get more work points for his additional contribution of effort. In
this case, the return to his increase in effective labor has only one
component, namely, a share of the increase in the output. How great the
increase in the work point share is for an additional unit of effective
labor depends on the degree of

accuracy in metering effort. Therefore, a

household's optimum level of effort contribution in a cooperative is
9

positively correlated with the degree of accuracy in metering effort in
the production process. The higher the degree of accuracy in the
measurement of effort, the more effort contributed.
However, effort monitoring is not costless. The management of the
cooperative farm thus needs to balance the gains in production due to the
increase in total contribution of effective labor and the rise in the
costs of monitoring. Other things being equal, the optimum degree of
monitoring is higher (lower), if the effort is easier (harder) to monitor
in the production process. Therefore, whether each household's optimum
level of effort contribution is high or low depends on how difficult and
costly the measurement of effort is in the production process.
It has been noticed by many economists that monitoring effort in
agricultural operations is particularly difficult because of agricultural
production's biological nature and sequential as well as spatial
dimensions. 7 Agricultural production is subject to infinite variations in
ecological conditions. It constantly requires that individual peasants
make on-the-spot decisions in response to slight differences in
temperature and soil moisture. In addition, the process of agricultural
production typically spans several months over several acres of land.
Farming also requires peasants to shift from one kind of job to another
throughout the production season. In general, the quality of work
provided by a peasant does not become apparent until harvest time.
Furthermore, it is impossible to determine each individual's contribution
by simply observing the outputs because of the random impacts of nature
on production. It is thus extremely costly to meter precisely each
household's effort contribution in agricultural production. Consequently,
10

in a cooperati ve farm primarily engaged in agricultu ral productio n, the
only practical method is to assign fixed flat work points for each day's
work. 8

This amounts to nonexiste nce of effort metering; however, it is

consisten t with the fact that monitorin g is extremely costly in
agricultu ral productio n.
The first-ord er condition (10) can be solved to obtain the effort
supply function for each household in the cooperati ve. In the Nash
equilibriu m, assuming the solution is unique, the function can be
expressed as:
(11)

e~(~, L, nk, P)
L

Since each household is assumed to be identical , in equilibriu m they will
all choose the same level of effort and thus contribut e the same amount
of effective labor.
Compariso ns of Household Farms and the Cooperati ve Farm
This section deliberat es on the implicati ons for social efficienc y
of household decisions in the modeled economy. If there is no monitorin g
issue, the answer is obvious that the cooperati ve farm is more efficient
than the sum of household farms because of the economies of scale.
However, in reality, as argued in the last subsectio n, the monitorin g of
effort in a cooperati ve farm is at most nominal; therefore , it is not
particula rly interesti ng or relevant to compare the efficienc y of the
cooperati ve farm with the household farm under such an ideal situation .
It seems to be a reasonabl e assumptio n, for practical purposes, that no
monitorin g exists in the cooperati ve farm. Essential ly, this is a
compariso n of two second-be st solutions . The cooperati ve farm captures
11

the economies of scale; however, it suffers from the inefficienc y arising
from the difficulty of monitoring. Moving to the household farms removes
the monitoring issue but sacrifices the gains from the economies of
scale. It is well known that such comparisons are generally intractable
without resort to closer specificatio n of the underlying functions. The
following relatively simple forms will be adopted. 9
General Cobb-Dougla s Production functions:
(l')

t

c, h.

Separable utility functions:
(2,)

The comparisons will proceed in three steps: first, the optimum
effort contributio ns by each household in both a household farm and the
cooperative farm are derived; then the resulting outputs in the household
farms and in the cooperative farm are calculated; and finally, the
utility levels attained by each household in the cooperative farm and in
the household farm are compared.
Adopting the specific forms of the structural equations and solving
for a household's optimum effort supply in its own household farm (6), we
get
(12)

Likewise, assuming no metering exists in the cooperative farm, solving
(11), we find that the optimum effort supply for each household in this
12

cooperative is:
(13)

Examining expressions (12) and (13), we find that if the "returns to
scale" are less than two and the production function is concave with
respect to effective labor, a household will contribute more effort in
his own household farm than in the cooperative farm.
By substitutin g (12) into (1), we find that the total social outputs
when these N households work independent ly is
(14)
Similarly, the total output of the cooperative is:
(15)
Comparing (14) and (15), we find that if the production function is
concave with respect to all its arguments, the total product from these
household farms is greater than that produced by the cooperative farm,
even the economies of scale are sacrificed in the household farms. 10 The
major source of returns to scale comes from the indivisibil ity of input,
however, almost all inputs in agricultura l production is divisible
(Schultz, chapter 8). It is thus unimaginabl e that the returns to scale
in agricultura l production can be greater than two. It is also
unimaginabl e that the condition that the production function is concave
with respect to all its arguments will be violated. Therefore, under the
condition that monitoring is extremely difficult in agricultura l
production, it should be safe to predict that a household will provide
13

more quantity of work as well as quality of work in the household farm
than in the cooperative farm and thus the total output produced by the
household farms is larger than that produced by the cooperative farm.
Although the total output will increase by moving from the
cooperative farming system to the household farming system, it is still
unclear that such a move is desirable to each household in the
cooperative farm as what matters is not the output but the welfare
attainable in each institution. However, if the household farming system
is Pareto-superio r to the cooperative farming system, there should be a
consensus for changing from the cooperative farming system to the
household farming system when this choice is available to members in the
cooperative farm. In this model the welfare attainable for each household
in the household farm and in the cooperative farm can be calculated by
substituting (12) and (14) into (2') and substituting (13) and (15) into
(2'). For each household the ratio of the utility attainable in the
cooperative farm to that in the household farm is
[N(b-1)/(1-a) . (1-a/N)]/(l-a).

(16)

The value of (16) depends on the value of N, a, and b. However, for N
2, and O < a, b < 1, it is almost certain that (16)

~

will be less than

one in the conceivable technology and thus the change from the
cooperative farming system to the household farming system is a Pareto
improvement.11
In short, when monitoring is difficult in the production process, a
cooperative farm is an inefficient institutional form compared with the
household farm both in terms of total output and social welfare criteria.
14

Although the economies of scale are sacrificed in changing from the
cooperative farming system to the household farming system, the increase
in the supply of effective labor outweighs the scale effect. Not only
does the total output increase as a result but also every household feels
happier.

II. DATA SOURCES
Two sets of data--one at the township level and the other at the
provincial level--are used in this study.

The township data set is

gathered from three counties in Chuxian Prefecture, Anhui Province, where
the new household farming system originated. The data include the input
and output of grain production in every township in Jiashan County,
Fengyang County, and Chuxian County. Anhui Province is located in the
mid-eastern part of China, about 500 miles south of Beijing and 200 miles
west of Shanghai.

It is a typical agricultural production area with

higher than average multiple-croppi ng practices.

In 1979, its multiple

cropping index was 180; 76.6% of its gross value of agricultural
production came from crop cultivation; and 78% of its sown area was for
grain production (Editorial Board of China Agriculture Yearbook 1980, pp.
100, 130). 12

Grain in Chinese statistics refers to rice, wheat, corn,

soybeans, and tubers. In Anhui Province, the main summer crop is rice,
and the main winter crop is wheat. The data used are gross outputs. No
attempt is made to adjust for seed.
The specific inputs include farm labor, foodgrain sown area, draft
animals, machinery, fertilizer, the ratio of irrigated area to total
cultivated area, and the ratio of the disaster-affect ed area to total
sown area (not available for Chuxian County). 13
15

The buffalo is the main

draft animal in these areas.
farm machines.
K20.

Machinery indicates the total horsepower of

Fertilizer includes the gross weights of N, P20s, and

Because grain is the main crop in these areas and also because data

on the other crops are not available, all draft animals, machinery, and
fertilizer are assumed to be used for grain production.

The ratio of the

area affected by disaster is included to account for variation in
weather.

Disaster refers to flood, drought, frost, freezing, typhoons,

and hailstorms.

The ratio is the area affected by disaster divided by

the sown area for grain production in each township.
The data span the years from 1979 to 1983. Jiashan County has 34
townships, Fengyang has 46 (three townships are excluded because of
missing irrigation data), and Chuxian has 22. The data on the number of
teams in each township that adopted the household responsibility system
in each year are not available. Nevertheless, the majority of production
teams in Jiashan County were transformed to the new household system in
1980, while the majority of production teams in the other two counties
were transformed in 1981 (see Table I). All data in each township are
provided by the Office for Rural Policy in each respective county.
Fengyang County is known for being one of the poorest counties in
China and the birthplace of the first emperor of the Ming dynasty.
Chuxian County is the capital of Chuxian Prefecture. Its economy is more
like that of a suburban county near a metropolis. Jiashan County is an
average county. The advantages of this data set are that these three
counties are located in the same prefecture and are adjacent to one
another. Therefore, we can infer from the data without worrying about the
differences in local government policies or in extreme natural
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disturbances. However, these three counties are not randomly selected.
The conclusions that are obtained from these three counties cannot be
generalized to other counties in China.
The second data set consists of each province's agricultural input
output data for 1981, 1982, and 1983. Agricultural production in this
study refers to crop cultivation, including foodgrain crops and cash
crops. Animal husbandry, forestry, fishery, and sideline production are
not included because they are not affected by the shift in the
institution as much as crop cultivation. 14
measured in the constant prices of 1980.

The output of agriculture is
The values of crop cultivation

consisted of 64.4%, 62.7%, and 62.1% of the total gross values of
agricultural output in 1981, 1982, and 1983, respectively.
The specific input variables that are included in this data set are
labor, sown areas, machinery, fertilizer, draft animals, and the ratio of
irrigated area to total cultivated area. Land, labor, machinery,
fertilizer, and draft animals are all in physical measures. The
definitions of these variables are the same as those included in the
first data set, except that sown area refers to the area sown for
foodgrain crops as well as cash crops and that fertilizer is measured in
terms of the weight of efficient ingredients, not in terms of gross
weight.
The new household farming system started to appear sporadically at
the end of 1978 in Anhui Province. However, for the nation as a whole, it
did not emerge as a significant factor until the end of 1980 (see Table
II). The ratio of teams to total teams in each province that were
transformed to the new household-based farming system are available for
17
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1981, 1982, and 1983. This is the main reason that these three years are
focused on. These data enable us to assess directly the impacts on
agricultural production of shifting from the old cooperative farming
system to the new household farming system.
All data, except for the material on the ratio of teams to total
teams that adopted the household-based system in each province, are
available in the 1982 to 1984 volumes of the China Agriculture Yearbook.
The data on each province's progress in adopting the household
responsibility system are provided by the National Research Center for
Rural Development in Beijing.
Both levels of data used in this study are official data. Because of
the lack of trained personnel and careful sampling frameworks, as well as
the present of political intervention, the quality of Chinese official
statistics has been a subject of debate. This doubt is not without
substance.

A footnote under the cultivated land

in The Almanac of

China's Economy 1981 (p. VI-3) reads, "The figure of cultivated land is
underestimated and remains to be verified."

Cadres at the local level

may under-report certain figures to evade taxes, as in the case of
cultivated land, or over-report certain figures to gain political favor,
as in the case of tractor-ploughe d areas (because this is one of the
indicators of modernization in Chinese agriculture).

However, in recent

years the consensus among those in academic circles involved with Chinese
studies seems to be that the Chinese official data are, after all, the
best available data.

In his introduction to a book that contains

examinations of the quality of Chinese statistics by several authorities
on the Chinese economy, Robert F. Dernberger sums up their joint findings
18

by saying that "the available official data [in China] do reflect the
basic trends of China's economic evolution, even though they contain a
margin of error when used as measures of absolute magnitudes in any
particular year" (Eckstein 1980, p. 60).

Because these data are the only

available data and also because the trends of change are the focus of
this study, the official statistics are therefore relied on as the sole
source of data.

III. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
The theory in Section I predicts that each household will provide
more effective labor and that, as a result, produce more output when the
farming institution moves from the cooperative system to the household
based system. To examine these hypotheses, a production function is
necessary. As adopted in the specific theoretical model, a general Cobb
Douglas function with effective labor, land, draft animals, machinery,
and fertilizer as inputs will be estimated. The production function
elasticities are allowed to vary linearly with the percentage of
cultivated land that is irrigated. This is an attempt to capture
differences in land quality and may also capture some output composition
effects, since irrigation is more important for rice than for wheat. In
two of the three counties, the areas that were affected by disaster are
available; the ratio of the disaster-covere d area to the total sown area
in each township is included to capture the weather effect in the
estimation of these two county's production functions. This specification
gives rise to the following estimating equation:

19

(17)

logQ =A+ (a1 + a2I)logL + (a3 + a4I)logS + (a5 + a6I)logD +
(a7 + agI)logM + (a9 + a10I)logF + a11I + a12R + µ,
with A= (a1 + a2I)loge,

where Lis labor, Sis sown area, Dis draft animals, Mis machinery, F
is chemical fertilizer (the above five conventional inputs are measured
in the units of average per team in order to reduce the possibility of
heteroscedasti city), I is the ratio of irrigated area to total cultivated
area, R is the ratio of the disaster-covere d area, andµ is the error
term.
From expressions (6) and (11), we see that the effort supplied by
each household is a function of the exogenously set output price and the
predetermined quantity of conventional inputs. The model shows that the
quantity of conventional inputs that enter the effort function depends on
the farming institutions; therefore, we can use the institution, a
cooperative system, or a household system, to denote the physical input
level. To be concrete,

(19)

loge

loge(P, IN)

where Pis the relative output price and IN indicate the farming
institution, a cooperative, or a household system. As one can see from
expressions (12) and (13), the second equality holds when the production
function is a Cobb-Douglas function. 15

If the output price does not

change and the farming institution in a region changes, then the change
in loge comes only from the changes in b2(.). Then a time dummy, which
captures the impacts of the changes in loge on production, can be used to
measure the impacts of the institutional change. Conversely, if the
20

farming institution does not change but output price changes, the time
dummy will measure the impact of the price change. In the case where the
price changes first and the institution changes later, a time dummy will
measure the impacts of institutional change and possibly the residual
impacts from price change, depending on the functional specification of
b1(.). However, by comparing two regions with a similar policy
environment, but one with an institutional change and the other one
without, we can infer from these two regions' respective time dummies how
much of the impact is due to the institutional change and how much is due
to the residual effect of the price change. Since a more than 20% rise in
the government procurement price of farm product was announced at the end
of 1978 and put into effect at the beginning of 1979, this is the
strategy that will be used in the analysis of the first data set. The
production function estimated in the first data set is thus,
(17')

logQ =Ao+ a 0 T + (a1 + a 2 I)logL + (a3 + a4I)logS +
(a5 + a6I)logD +

(a7 + a3I)logM + (a9 + a10I)logF

+ a11I + a12R + µ,

where Ao is a constant term and Tis a time dummy, and aoT measures the
magnitude of changes in A.
In the provincial level data, we have the percentage of teams in
each province that were transformed to the household-based farming
system. In this case, b2(.) is a function of RT, the ratio of teams to
total teams in each province that had adopted the new system. We will
hypothesize that b2(.) has the following simple functional form:
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(20)
As the changes in loge, and thus the impacts on production from the
changes in the institution in each province, can be assessed from the
coefficient of RT in a cross-sectiona l time series regression, we are
left with one degree of freedom. The impacts from the rise in the
government procurement price, which was imposed by the government on
every part of China at the same time, and the residual effects from this
rise on production in each following years can be assessed by the
coefficients of time dummies. 16 The production function that will be
estimated in the provincial data set is thus,

(17")

0

logQ =Ao+ a RT + aoT + (a1 + a2I)logL + (a3 + a4I)logS +
(a5 + a6I)logD +

(a7 + agI)logM + (ag + a10I)logF

+ a11I + µ,
where a

0

= (a1 + a2I)c1.

It should be mentioned that RT itself is an endogenous variable. The
transformation from the cooperative farming system to the household
farming system in each province can be interpreted as an induced
institutional innovation process. 17 Among other things, if an area is
more suitable for group farming due to its topology or other reasons, the
transformation to the household system will be slower because the gains
from this transformation are smaller. Regional characteristic is not
observable to econometrician. It is included in the error term of the
regression function. Consequently, RT is correlated with the error term.
Furthermore, the size of a cooperative farm, the adopted technologies,
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namely the machinery, draft animals, and fertilizer that are used in a
cooperative farm, should also reflect its regional characteristic;
therefore, they are not uncorrelated with the error term either.
Therefore, the OLS regression will not be able to produce an unbiased
estimate of the coefficients. To avoid the time-persistent regional
specific effect and obtain an consistent estimate of the coefficients,
the fixed-effects model will be used in the fitting of expressions (17')
and (17").

IV. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply the model to analyze the impacts of
shifting from the cooperative farming system to the household farming
system in the three counties in Anhui Province and in the 29 provinces in
China. The estimates of the first data set are based on expression (17')
and the second data set on expression (17"). Table III reports the
results of fitting the grain production functions in Jiashan County,
Fengyang County, and Chuxian County

with the fixed-effects model. AF

test is performed to test the hypothesis that all regional intercepts in
each regression are equal. The test and its degree of freedom are
presented at the bottom of the table as Fl.

Another F-test is

implemented to test the hypothesis that the interaction variables are
jointly equal to zero. Its result and associated degree of freedom are
presented as F2 at the bottom of the table. The first hypotheses can all
be rejected at less than 1% level of confidence. These results confirm
our intuition that the fixed-effects model instead of the OLS should be
applied to fit the regression functions. However, the second tests show
that the interaction variables are jointly insignificant in Jiashan
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County. Jiashan County's regression function is thus reestimated with the
interaction variables dropped. Its result is presented in the second
column of the table.
The productivity changes in each county are estimated by the time
dummies. To interpret their implications, the yearly productivity growth
in each county is calculated. These estimates, together with the year of
major institutional change in each county, are reported in Table IV. From
this table we see that Jiashan County had its major institutional change
in 1980 and also had the highest productivity growth in 1979-1980. The
same story holds for Fengyang and Chuxian Counties. Both counties had
their major institutional changes occurred in 1981 and their highest
productivity growth was in the period of 1980-1981. In 1979-1980,
Jiashan's productivity growth was 15.2% compared to 8.9% and 3.4% in
Fengyang and Chuxian. 18 Conversely, in 1980-1981 Fengyang and Chuxian had
productivity growth of 16.9% and 22.1% compared with Jiashan's -.7%.
Although Jiashan also had a 10.9% productivity growth in 1981-1982 and
Chuxian had a 11.4% productivity growth in 1982-1983; they were both
preceded by negative productivity growth in the previous periods. It
should be safe to conclude from this evidence that the two-digit
productivity growth in Jiashan County between 1979 and 1980, and in
Fengyang and Chuxian Counties between 1980 and 1981 basically came from
the increases in each household's effort contribution as a result of
shifting from the cooperative farming system to the household farming
system.
The same procedures are applied to estimate the agricultural
production function in China. For the purpose of comparison, this
24

production function is also estimated by the OLS regression. The results
form these estimations are reported in column 1 and column 2 of Table V.
The difference in the estimated impact of the institutional change on
production between these two estimating procedures is very striking. The
OLS estimation shows that the change in the farming system did not have
any significant impact on agricultural production and the major sources
of productivity growth between 1981 and 1983 came from the previous price
rise or other policy changes that are captured by the year dummies.
However, the fixed-effects estimation shows just the opposite: the major
source of productivity growth came from the change in the farming
institution, and the other policy changes did not have significant
effects. Since prior knowledge indicates that the diffusion of the new
household farming system in each province was correlated with its latent
specific characteristics and the hypothesis that all provincial
interceptions are equal is rejected (F23 44 = 10.88), the estimate from
'

the fixed-effects model is the correct one. The estimated coefficient of
.18 for the RT variable suggests that, due to the increase in each
household's effort supply, shifting from the cooperative farming system
to the household farming system will result in a 19.7% increase in the
total output for given amounts of inputs. Between 1980 and 1983, 83.5% of
the total cooperative teams in China were transformed to the household
farms (see table II). This institutional change thus implied a 16.4%
productivity jump between 1980 and 1983.

Measured in 1980's prices, the

gross value of crop cultivation grew 26.4% between 1980 and 1983 (State
Statistic Bureau 1984, p. 133); therefore, about 62% of this output
growth can be attributed to the change in the farming institution alone.
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The theoretical model in Section I suggests that, only if the
returns to scale are less than two, the shift from the cooperative system
to the household system will increase each household's effort supply and
thus the total output. To see if this condition holds, the implied output
elasticities are calculated from the estimated production functions in
Tables III and V and are reported in Table VI. From the last row of Table
VI, we find that none of them have returns to scale significantly
different from one.
Comparing the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects model and
the OLS in the national agricultural production functions, we find that
the labor coefficient has the largest increase in value and the
fertilizer coefficient has the largest drop when switching from the OLS
model to the fixed-effects model. This evidence suggests that more
productive areas use more fertilizer and less labor in their production.
This is consistent with Stone's finding about fertilizer application in
China. The estimated coefficients of draft animals, machinery, and
fertilizer are all not significantly different from zero in the national
production function. Since any errors in measurement are magnified in the
fixed-effects models, the insignificance in the estimate of these three
coefficients may arise from the imprecision associated with the larger
aggregation in the provincial data set. In the estimated grain production
functions in the county level, these coefficients are all quite
significant except for the coefficient of machinery in Jiashan County.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper examines a household's behaviors in the cooperative farm
and in the household farm. The central assumption is that a household
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utility function exists. This assumption enables us to study each
household's optimum effort contributions in these two different
institutions and to compare the relative efficiencies of these two
institutions. In the cooperative farm, the economies of scale are
captured; however, the measurement of each household's effort
contribution is required for the purpose of income distribution within
the farm. A household farm sacrifices the returns to scale; but it can be
saved from the trouble of metering effort. Basically, this is a
comparison of two second-best solutions. A question for study is which
consideration is more relevant in the real world for a household's
decision regarding its effort supply. Since monitoring is extremely
difficult and costly in agricultural production, the only practical
method in an agricultural cooperative is to assign a peasant flat work
points for each day's work without regarding his actual quantity and
quality of work. This practice amounts to nonexistence of monitoring.
Under the assumption of no monitoring in the cooperative system and the
specifications of a general Cobb-Douglas production function and a
separable utility function, it is found that, if the returns to scale are
less than two, a household will offer more effort in the household farm
than in the cooperative farm. As a result, the total output produced will
be larger in the household farming system than in the cooperative farming
system even though the economies of scale are sacrificed in the household
system. In addition, a change from the cooperative system to the
household system is very likely to be a Pareto-improvem ent. In the above
discussion, we assume that households are homogeneous. If the endowments
preference are different among households, it can be verified that each
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household will also offer more effort in the household farm than in the
cooperative farm and, as a result, more output will be produced in the
household farming system. Nevertheles s, the shift from the cooperative
farming system to the household farming system may not be a Pareto
improvement . For those households that strongly prefer leisure, they are
better-off in the cooperative farm than in the household farm.
Data collected from recent rural decollectiv ization in China is
applied to examine the implication s of the above model. The evidence from
both the township-le vel data and the province-le vel data shows that the
change from the cooperative farming system to the household farming
system has significant effects on agricultura l production. It is found
that this institution al change has resulted in a 19.7% productivit y jump
and that over 60% of the agriculture output growth in China between 1980
and 1983 can be attributed to the change in the farming institution .
The laborer is the most dynamic factor in the production process. A
laborer not only works but also utilizes the other factors of production.
An institution will be an efficient mode of production only if it can
provide the laborers with adequate incentives. The producers' cooperative
as an institution may be desirable in other industries where monitoring
is comparative ly easy to perform or returns to scale are extremely large.
The cooperative , nevertheles s, is not an efficient institution in
agriculture . Although a household farm cannot capture the economies of
scale, this institution can provide peasants with adequate incentives to
work. Therefore, the household farming system is a more efficient
institution for the development of agriculture .
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FOOTNOTES
This paper is an extension of my dissertation research at the
University of Chicago. I would like to thank D. Gale Johnson, Theodore W.
Schultz, and Sherwin Rosen, members of my thesis committee, for their
inspiration and guidance throughout my graduate studies. I am greatly
indebted to Robert F. Dernberger, Robert E. Evenson, Mark R. Rosenzweig,
T. N. Srinivansan, John Strauss, George Tolley, Thomas B. Weins for their
comments on early drafts of this paper. This paper has also benefited
from comments from workshop participants at the University of Chicago and
the University of Maryland. The financial support of the Rockefeller
Foundation GA PS 8618 is gratefully acknowledged
1 For a review of earlier literature, see Schiller,
chapters 2, 7
and 10; Warriner, chapter 3; Tai, chapter 8. For a review of recent
literature, see Bonin and Putterman, chapters 5 and 6.
2 The coefficient of economies of scale estimated
by Griliches for
the United States' agriculture was about 1.3. The coefficient estimated
by Hayami and Ruttan for the developed countries was also about 1.3 (See,
Hayami and Ruttan, p. 147).
3 From what I know, the only paper that goes beyond
the simple cross
tabulation and correlation is Carter's. Even in the literature that
compares the industrial cooperative firm with the traditional firm,
rigorous econometric studies also very limited. Jones and Svejnar
criticize that the other researchers' evidence about the relative
efficiency of a cooperative firm is derived from an ad hoc inclusion of
the relevant institutional variables into a production framework;
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however, they do not explain why the institutional variables should be
included in the production function of their own study.
4 This subsection draws on Lin, 1987b.
5h(.) is assumed to be a nonstochastic function in this paper. At
first glance, it might appear to be preferable to make it stochastic.
However, the work point share, si, would become a ration of two random
variables. The expectation of si as well as Ii might fail to exist.
Consequently, the problem become unsolvable without making other more
strained assumptions. The same argument also applies to the production
function, Q(.). If Q(.) is stochastic, the comparisons of relative
efficiency, in next subsection, between the cooperative farm and the
household farm will become a ratio of two random variables.
6The same assumption is adopted by Calvo and Wellisz. This is also
the practice generally used in the Chinese production team. A male worker
is credited for 10 work points for each day's work no matter how hard he
actually works.
7 see for example, Schultz chapter 8; Hayami and Kikuchi chapter 2;
Brewster; and Binswanger and Rosenzweig.
8 It is widely documented in both Chinese and Western literature that
a peasant got fixed work points for each day's work due to the difficulty
of monitoring. See, for example, Chen; Perkins and Yusuf. The same
situation also occurs in Soviet collective farms. See Johnson and Brooks,
p. 179; and Bradley and Clark.
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9 The same specificatio ns are adopted by Lucas
in his comparisons of
the efficiency between wage and share tenancy.

N (b-1)/(1-a) < 1 if b < 1, a< 1.
11Readers can verify that (16) < 1 will not
hold only when bis very
close to one. When N = 5 and b

~

.8 the utility index in the household

farm will be higher than that in the cooperative farm no matter what
value a takes. Even when N = 2, the utility index is still higher in the
household farm for b

~

.6.

12 For the nation as a whole, 66.9% of its
gross value of
agricultura l output came from crop cultivation and 80.3% of its sown area
was for foodgrain production. The multiple cropping index was 149%
(Editorial Board of China Agriculture Yearbook 1980, pp. 100, 130).
13 rn Chinese statistics the disaster-af fected
area refers to the
sown area that is affected by natural disturbance s and resulted in a
reduction of 30% or more output compared with that of a normal year
(State Statistical Bureau, 1981, p.201).
14The main activity of a production team was
cropping. Most of the
animal husbandry and household sideline production was engaged in by
individual households even before the household responsibil ity system was
instituted. Fisheries and forestries are not important for most
provinces. For China as a whole, their combined weight in total value of
agricultura l output was only 5.3% in 1980 (Editorial Board of China
Agricultura l Yearbook, 1981).
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15 This separability is extremely useful in the estimation. If
we
have two instruments, one for the price change and one for the
institutional change, we will be able to estimate their respective
effects even though the price change and the institutional change
happened simultaneously.
16 The time dummies in (17") will also pick up the effects from
other
regional-invari ance but time-variance changes, such as changes in the
weather. Nevertheless, the weather seems to be very stable in these three
years. The disaster-affect ed areas were 125 million, 107 million, and 108
million hectares, respectively (State Statistic Bureau, p. 190).
17 For a detailed discussion of the diffusion process of
the new
household-based farming system and a test of the induced institutional
innovation hypothesis, see Lin 1987a.
18 Fengyang county's productivity growth in 1979-1980
was also fairly
high; this might be due to the fact that about 50% of its production
teams was transformed to the household system between April and November
of 1979 (see Table I). If a high percentage of these teams was changed
before the summer crop season, its impacts productivity growth would also
show up in the 1979-1980 period.
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TABLE I
Progress in the Household Responsibility System in
Jiashan, Fengyang, and Chuxian Counties, 1979-1981

Date

Jiashan
No. of Teams
Changed(%)

Fengyang
No. of Teams
Changed(%)

Chuxian
No. of Teams
Changed(%)

1979:
Jan.

0

Aug.

7

Dec.

209

2

(0.05)

1

(0.2)

2

(0.05)

1

(6.2)

2

(0.05)

129

Feb.

2,330 (64.2)

2

(0.05)

267 (15.2)

Apr.

2,978 (82.0)

740 (19.8)

397 (22.3)

Nov.

3,554 (96.8)

2,592 (68.3)

968 (54.4)

Mar.

3,651 (99.1)

3,730 (98.6)

1,659 (93.0)

June

3,647 (99.0)

3,765 (99.5)

1,718 (96.0)

(7. 7)

1980:

1981:

SOURCES: Data are provided by the Research Office for Rural Policy
of Chuxian Prefecture.
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TABLE II
Progress in the Household Responsibility System
in China, 1980-1983

1980
Jan.
Proportion
of
teams (%)

1.02

Dec.

14.4

1981
July

28.2

1982

1983

Oct.

Dec.

Dec.

45.1

80.4

97.9

SOURCES: The data concerning 1980-1981 are from Jingjixue
zhoubao (Economic weekly) (January 11, 1982). Figures
for 1982 and 1983 are from the China Agriculture
Yearbook (1983 and 1984).
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TABLE III
Grain Production Functions: Fixed-Effects Models

Variables

Jiashan County
(1)

Labor

1.23
(. 77)

Labor x irr.

(2)

.33
(.23)

-1.25
(. 96)

Sown area
Sown area x irr.

.10
(. 42)
.67

.38
(.20)

(.58)

Draft animals
Draft animals x irr.
Machinery
Machinery x irr.
Fertilizer

.19
(.22)
-.20
(.38)
-.02
(.20)
.28
(.28)
- . 02
( .11)

Fertilizer x irr.
Irrigation
Disaster

Yl
Y2
Y3

Y4
R2
Fl
F2

.28
(.18)
.14
(3.03)
- .41
(.14)
.16
(. 05)
.16
(.06)
.29
(.07)
.19

(.09)
.70
3.02
[33,120]

.25
( .13)

Fengyang County
(3)

Chuxian County

.52
(.20)
-.37
(.28)
.31
(.15)
-.19
(.23)
.20
(.16)

1. 28
(. 72)

-.22

.14
(.07)

(.25)
-.06
(.07)
.25
( .13)

.14
(. 05)
.20
(.19)
- .47

(.14)
.14
(. 05)
.14
(.06)
.24
(.07)
.14
(.09)
.70

.85

[5,120]

.05
(. 06)
.19
(.09)
1.88
(1. 37)
-.75
(.15)
.09
(. 03)
.24
(. 04)
.31
(. 05)
.33
(.06)
.90
3.90
[43,156]
2.16
[5,156]

(4)

-1.17
(.89)
-.95

(.50)
1. 39
(.64)
.12
(. 45)
.17
(.54)
.27
(.16)
-.25
(.19)
-.09
(.12)
.20
(.14)
-3.88
(4.26)

.03
(. 02)
.23
(.03)
.23
(.04)
.34
(. 04)
.94
13.48

[21,73]
2.87
[5,73]

Note: Conventional variables are measured with team as unit.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Fl tests for the hypothesis that
intercepts are equal across regions. F2 tests for the hypothesis that
interaction variables are jointly zero. Degrees of freedom are in square
brackets. Constant terms are suppressed.
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TABLE IV
Year of Major Institutional Change and
Estimated Yearly Productivity Growth

Year of Major
Institutional
Change

Yearly Productivity Growth(%)
1979-1980

1980-1981

1981-1982 1982-1983

Jiashan
County

1980

15.2
(4.7)

- .7
(5.5)

10.9
(4.6)

-9.5
(4.3)

Fengyang
County

1981

8.9
(3.2)

16.9
(3.0)

6.6
(2.9)

3.2
(2.6)

Chuxian
County

1981

3 .4
(2.5)

22.1
(2.5)

- .1
(2.6)

11.4
(2.0)

NOTE: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Jiashan County's
yearly growth is calculated from column 2 of Table III, Fengyang County's
from column 3, and Chuxian County's from column 4. Chuxian County's
estimated growth for 1980-1981 and 1982-1983 is over-estimated and for
1981-1982 is under-estimated, as the information on the disaster-covered
areas for each township in Chuxian County is not available. As for the
county as a whole, the areas affected by disaster were 155,585 mu for
1979; 137,200 mu for 1980; 9,821 mu for 1981; 71,987 mu for 1982; and
25,229 mu for 1983.

40

TABLE V
Estimates of Agricultural Production Function in China

Variables

Labor
Labor x irr.
Sown area

Fixed-Effects Model
(1)
1. 25
(.58)
-1. 70
( 1. 12)
1. 50

OLS
(2)
-.78
(.30)

2.41
(. 57)
.61

Draft animals

- .40
(.30)

Draft animals x irr.

1.13

( .12)
.35
(.23)
-.15
(.07)
- . 01

(. 45)

(. 09)

Machinery

-.14
(.25)
.35

.13
( .13)
-.52
(.23)

(.73)

Sown area x irr.

Machinery x irr.

-1. 58
(1.14)

(.54)
Fertilizer
Fertilizer x irr.
Irrigation

RT
Yl

Fl
F2

.18
(.14)
-.34
(.24)
12.43
(5.80)
.18
(. 05)

.60

(. 08)
-.78

( .14)
-8.82
(2.20)
.04

(. 08)

.04
(. 03)
.03
(. 04)

.09
(. 04)

.80

.95

.15
(. 06)

10.88
[28,44]
3.42

[5,44]
Note: Conventional variables are measured with team as unit. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Fl tests for the hypothesis that intercepts
are equal across regions. F2 tests for the hypothesis that interaction
variables are jointly zero. Degrees of freedom are in square brackets.
Constant terms are suppressed.
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TABLE VI
Estimated Output Elasticities

Input

Jiashan
County

Labor

.33
(.23)
Sown Area
.38
(.20)
Draft Animal .25

Fertilizer

Sum

Chuxian
County

(FE)

Nation
(OLS)

.14
( .17)
.14
(. 05)

.31
(.10)
.20
(. 09)
.08
(. 05)
.09
(.05)
.16
(. 04)

.25
(. 08)
.08
(. 03)
.07
(.03)

.50
(.31)
.81
(. 40)
.09
( .19)
.02
(. 18)
.03
(.04)

1. 24
( .19)

.84
(.08)

.92
(.12)

1.45
(.32)

( .13)

Machinery

Fengyang
County

.38
(.15)
.14
( .13)

.27
( .11)
. 77

(.06)
-.15
(.04)
-.09
(.05)
.25
(. 03)
1.05
( .11)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Jiashan County's
elasticities are copied from column 2, Table III. Fengyang's and
Chuxian's are calculated from columns 3 and 4 in Table III, while the
nation's are calculated from columns 1 and 2 in Table IV. The weights
used in the calculation are the geometric average of the ratios of
irrigated land to total cultivated land in 1983. They are .594 for
Fengyang County, .778 for Chuxian County, and .437 for the nation.
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